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Leadership is defined as “a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (Northouse, 2019, p. 5). In the case of Jon Krakauer’s account of the tragic events that unfolded during Everest’s 1996 climbing season in his book Into Thin Air, the common goal was to summit Mount Everest with some sense of assurance, and to descend it in relative safety while “[putting] one’s faith in the guide” (1999, p. 40) or leader assigned to the task.

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Rob Hall and Scott Fisher are the “assigned” leaders of the expedition (Northouse, 2019, p. 8). Both of whom possessed a high degree of “intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity, and sociability” (p. 24-25), that is further confirmed through their respective successes in mountain climbing and their businesses that draw upon their leadership abilities. Although their leadership styles differ greatly, with Hall aiming for a “methodical, fastidious approach to climbing” whereas Fisher’s approach, a more relaxed “damn-the-torpedoes approach to ascent” (Krakauer, 1999, p. 66), they both possessed a significant amount of “technical” and “human” skill that realigns their successes in a manner that makes them rival co-workers (Northouse, 2019, p. 44).

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Upon further examination using the Behavioral Approach to leadership, Hall’s style can best be coined “Team Management” (p. 78) whereby his acute attention to technical detail ultimately paved the way for a planned “siege [of] the mountain” (Krakauer, 1999, p. 78). This complimented his general concern for his clients, that despite wanting to adhere to his strict climbing plan, ultimately permitted himself the opportunity to personally ensure the summit for Hansen thus demonstrating that even he succumbed to the pressure of a paying client’s goal attainment resulting in one of the reasons he lost his life. Fisher, on the other hand, gave his clients a high degree of freedom allowing them to “go up and down the mountain independently during the acclimatization period” (p. 113). Although this approach may have worked in a manner that rendered Fisher more “agreeable, eager to help, comforting, and uncontroversial” (Northouse, 2019, p. 78), in a situation that is heavily reliant on technical prowess, it meant that his clients and support staff were often left without immediate assistance and leadership that led to several misfortunes including the death of Ngawang, but that also gave rise to emergent leaders such as Schoening and Madsen who had to step in to fill the shoes of the missing guides due to Fisher’s “Country-Club” leadership style (Northouse, 2019, p. 77).

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Ultimately, in a challenge that is the ascending of Mount Everest, the burden lies on the leaders to address the particular situation of each of their clients and work with them to guide them up and down the hill. Technical ability and intrinsic motivation are at the helm of each client’s possible success. Therefore, in retrospect, Fisher’s decision to let his clients climb at will may have allowed for those more inclined in technical ability to practice the ascent whereby those in need of more support would climb at their own pace. However, the leaders and guides were not spread out strategically to make this approach a successful one, thus leading to several casualties given the lack of structured support. At the same time, Hall’s doctrine of ascending the mountain together may have addressed the importance of ensuring a helping hand is available when needed, since the group would not be spread out, however, it meant that clients who could have otherwise assisted in certain matters and emerge as leaders themselves, often felt that they must respect the rules that Hall set forth which were to essentially wait it out (Krakauer, 1999, p. 196).

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Hall and Fisher needed to combine their traits, skills, respective behavioral approaches to leadership and “match their style [of leadership] to the competence and commitment of the followers” (Northouse, 2019, p. 96) thus embodying Situational Leadership; a challenge that is extremely difficult especially given the varying degrees of ability spread throughout the groups. At the same time, there is an unspoken understanding that should have reigned clear in that “[f]or safety’s sake, a responsible guide will always insist on calling the shots – he or she simply can’t afford to let each client make important decision independently” (Krakauer, 1999, p. 176). A sentiment that is likely shared by the clients, in that when push comes to shove, the leader needs to make the difficult decisions in their best interest even if those decisions are not what they want to hear, thus demonstrating Adaptive Leadership (Northouse, 2019, p. 257).  Unfortunately, and against Hall’s track-record, Hall made some detrimental decisions that went against his better judgement, empathizing with his client’s goals including those of Hansen to finally reach the summit, and allowing Beck the opportunity to assess his failing condition on his own instead of making the call to send him back as soon as possible are just some examples. Fisher is also culpable for his lack of judgment, allowing the free-for-all of his support staff and those of his clients therefore leaving him with much of the responsibility to get everyone to safety which was obviously humanly impossible. His inability to delegate and create a structured approach to the task at hand, in a situation where it is arguably required, is what also led to his unfortunate death.

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Culture involves “the learned beliefs, values, rules, norms, symbols, and traditions that are common to a group of people” (p. 434). Culture played a major role in the circumstances on the mountain during the expedition in 1996. For example, Bourkreev, a Russian guide on Fisher’s team, believed that clients who are not able to ascend under their own strength and will do not belong on Everest (Krakauer, 1999, p. 156). He came from “a tough, proud, hardscrabble climbing culture that did not believe in coddling the weak. [Furthermore in] Eastern Europe guides were trained to act more like Sherpas – hauling loads, fixing ropes, establishing the route – and less like caretakers” (p. 156). As such, Bourkreev’s approach to guiding was hugely hands off and this was further reflected in his choices to ascend irresponsibly and refusing to take precautions (like the use of oxygen) for his own safety should he be needed for the clients on his team. This made Fisher extremely upset and it added significantly to his workload since he had to transport the weight that Bourkreev refused to carry.

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The Sherpas “mountain people, devoutly Buddhist, … hardworking, affable, and intelligent … [and] physiologically adapted to the rigors of high altitude” (p. 46-47), are in and of themselves the culture that is Mount Everest. They are loyal to their guides, for the most part, and an integral part of the climbing culture. In fact, Hall acknowledges their presence and ensures that they are well taken care of and respected. Hall’s respect for the Sherpas is not shared by all the leaders, however. Their participation in the climb and the work they do to ensure the common person has even the slightest chance of scaling Mount Everest, is vital and indispensable to “the success of [the] expedition” (p. 110). However, the Sherpas’ pride is a major weakness. This was evident in Ngawang’s case. Visably unwell, he refuses to descend to Base Camp therefore exemplifying “machismo in the Sherpa culture that makes many men extremely reluctant to acknowledge physical infirmities” (p. 112). Sherpas, who follow the directions of their leaders, refused to take orders from others as was the case when Hunt asked for their assistance in the case of Ngawang, of which their refusal to assist contributed to his immanent death.

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This then brings up the hierarchal nature of the climbing culture itself. For example, Hall’s commanding respect from all those present at the foot of Everest and in ascent, to guides and Sherpas refusing to step over each others’ toes when faced with major decisions, and even the “guide-client protocol” that prevented the stronger climbers, like Krakauer, from acting on instinct to potentially emerge as a leader when he faced difficult scenarios. In the end the climbing culture offers the opportunity to “join a self-contained, rapidly idealistic society”, whereby the climb itself is more prestigious than reaching the summit (p. 23). However, it brings with it a hierarchy and status that, in this case, blocked others from executing vital decisions and engaging in leadership when most needed.

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The lessons offered through the tragedy in 1996 can be best summarized with what Peter Athans, a highly experienced and “respected guide” once said; that “[s]ome people don’t understand that an Everest expedition can’t be run like a Swiss train” (Krakauer, 1999, p. 26). Despite the good and bad decisions in leadership on the mountain that year, along with uncontrollable circumstances ranging from the weather to even the rivalry and opportunism that presented itself between Hall and Fisher who were both competing for their respective businesses that relied on their client’s success stories, the outcome is not always guaranteed. In essence, the lessons learned are simply that past experience does not always guarantee the present, and that despite one’s experience and approach to leadership, sometimes the resulting situation succumbs to “the nature of systems to break down with a vengeance” (p. 287).

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References

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Krakauer, J. (1999). Into thin air. Anchor Books.

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Northouse, P. G. (2019). Leadership: Theory and practice (8th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.